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 Do Judicially Created Grounds for 
Vacating Arbitral Awards Still Exist? 
Why Manifest Disregard of the Law 
and Public Policy Exceptions Should 
be Considered under Vacatur 
Visiting Nurse Association of Florida, Inc. v. Jupiter Medical Center, Inc., 145 
So. 3d 1115 (Fla. 2014). 
ASHLEY K. SUNDQUIST* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When parties enter into an agreement with an arbitration provision, an arbitra-
tor will typically have the final say in the dispute.  Successful challenges to arbi-
tral awards in court are rare, although there are several exceptions.  The grounds 
for vacating an arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) are set 
forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10.1  Courts have created additional grounds for vacatur, in-
cluding where awards manifestly disregard the law and when awards violate pub-
lic policy.2  However, the United States Supreme Court in Hall Street created a 
divide among the circuits as to whether judicially created grounds for vacatur are 
still permissible.3 
The Court’s strong language in Hall Street indicated the Court’s intent for the 
FAA to provide the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitral award.  Therefore, 
once the Court addresses the circuit split, it will likely hold that judicially created 
grounds are not an acceptable form of vacatur.  However, doing so would cause 
individuals injustice, in particular where awards manifestly disregard the law and 
go against public policy.  This Note argues that if the Court abolishes judicially 
created grounds, it should reinterpret the FAA to include manifest disregard of the 
law and violations to public policy under the exceeded powers exception of the 
statute. 
This Note begins in Part II by discussing the facts and holding of Visiting 
Nurse Association of Florida, Inc. v. Jupiter Medical Center, Inc.4  In Part III, this 
Note sets forth the legal background of vacatur and some of the most recent cases 
                                                          
     *B.B.A., University of Wisconsin 2009, J.D./MBA, University of Missouri 2016. I would like to 
thank the editoral staff of the Journal of Dispute Resolution for the time spent helping edit this Note.  I 
would also like to thank my husband and my parents who have edited numerous papers and who have 
helped me to become a much better writer.   
 1. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
3.  See Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Fla. v. Jupiter Medical Ctr., Inc., 145 So. 3d 1115, 1130 (Fla. 2014). 
1130 (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street . . . has led to a federal circuit court split regarding 
whether Hall Street prohibits all extra-statutory grounds for vacating an award, including judicially 
created grounds.”). 
 4. Visiting Nurse Ass’n, 145 So. 3d at 1119. 
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on this issue.  Part IV discusses the legal reasoning behind the Florida Supreme 
Court decision in Visiting Nurse Association and Part V argues that the Supreme 
Court should permit vacatur when an arbitrator manifestly disregards the law and 
when the award goes against public policy. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
In February 2005, Visiting Nurse Association (VNA) and Jupiter Medical 
Center (JMC) entered into an agreement for VNA to purchase JMC’s hospital-
based home health care agency for $639,000.5  Additionally, VNA and JMC filed 
a separate “office lease” agreement in which VNA agreed to occupy 5,000 square 
feet of office space in the hospital for $375,000 in exchange for JMC’s Home 
Health Agencies (HHA) referrals.6  Under the agreement, JMC would recommend 
VNA’s HHA for patients who expressed no preference for another HHA.7  VNA 
believed it could generate $1.5 million in revenue per year based on the 45 to 50 
Medicare referrals JMC would provide each month.8 
In November 2006, VNA suspected that JMC was rotating its HHA referrals 
to ensure equal distribution of HHAs and thereby reducing the number of patients 
being referred to VNA in violation of the agreement.9  In September 2007, JMC 
notified VNA that due to a shortage of office space, VNA could not continue to 
use the office space in the hospital and terminated the lease agreement.10 
On November 1, 2007, VNA initiated arbitration proceedings against JMC 
for breach of contract.11  VNA alleged that JMC breached the contract by imple-
menting a rotating HHA referral system and by terminating VNA’s lease agree-
ment.12  An arbitration panel delivered an interim award for VNA, issuing damag-
es of $1,251,213 and interest of $900,000 due to VNA’s loss of referrals.13  Addi-
tionally, the panel awarded $352,267 to VNA for attorney’s fees and other fees.14 
JMC filed a motion for reconsideration with the panel after the interim award 
was pronounced arguing that panel’s interpretation of the agreement violated mul-
tiple state and federal healthcare laws and regulations and therefore should not 
have been enforced.15  Specifically, JMC argued that the contract, which allowed 
                                                          
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. The discharge procedures indicated that any patient requiring home health services post 
discharge would receive a discharge plan list of HHAs, which was provided by JMC.  The list was 
updated annually and informed the patient of his or her right to freely choose the home health agency 
of their choice.  The last provision stated, “If, after following the foregoing procedures, the patient 
expresses no preference, [JMC] will inform the patient of its relationship with the VNA.  The purpose 
of establishing a working relationship with the VNA is to facilitate the smooth transfer of patients into 
post-hospital care and thereby reduce the average length of stay for hospitalization.”  Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Visiting Nurse Ass’n, 154 So. 3d at 119. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1120-21. 
 14. Id. at 1121.  The fees included $214,047.50 in attorney’s fees, $16,550 in administrative filing 
fees and expenses, and $71,780.07 in arbitrators’ fees and expenses.  Additionally, JMC was required 
to reimburse VNA $49,890.05 for fees and expenses previously incurred by VNA.  Id. 
 15. Id.  Some of the laws JMC alleged the agreement violated were Florida’s Anti-Kickback Stat-
utes, FLA. STAT. §§ 465.054, 395.0185 (2009), the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7(b)(b) (2012), Medicare Hospital Condition of participation; Discharge planning, 42 C.F.R. § 482.43 
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the parties to influence future patient referrals, was in violation of multiple federal 
and state kickback laws and therefore should not be enforced.16  The panel denied 
the motion to reopen the award decision because the panel stated they had consid-
ered the violations during deliberations.17 
With no other recourse available, JMC filed a motion to vacate the arbitration 
award in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Court in Palm Beach County, Florida, argu-
ing that the award should be vacated because the panel impermissibly construed 
the contract.18  The state circuit court dismissed the motion to vacate and granted 
VNA’s motion to enforce the award.19  On appeal, the Florida District Court of 
Appeals, Fourth District, held that although the illegality of a contract is not a 
basis to vacate an arbitral award, the trial court must consider such illegality in 
determining whether to enforce the award.20  The Fourth District ultimately re-
versed and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the legality of the 
contract.21 
Upon the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, VNA filed a petition to the Florida Supreme 
Court, arguing that the Fourth Circuit’s ruling directly conflicted with the holding 
in Commercial Interiors Corporation of Boca Raton v. Pinkerton & Laws, Inc.,22 
which held that a trial court’s disagreement with an arbitrator’s application of the 
law is not a sufficient basis to vacate an arbitral award.23  VNA claimed that the 
only grounds on which a court can vacate an arbitration award are set forth in 
Florida Statute 682.13, which does not include illegality of a contract.24  JMC 
argued that the illegality of a contract is a judicially created ground not recognized 
in the statute, and thus, the arbitration panel exceeded its powers by not consider-
ing the legality of the contract.25 
The Florida Supreme Court held that the referral of Medicare patients was a 
transaction that involved interstate commerce and was therefore subject to the 
FAA.26  Under the FAA, a court cannot review an arbitrator’s determination of the 
legality of a contract.27  Therefore, the court held that the arbitration panel did not 
exceed its powers by construing the contract to be a lawful agreement.28  Addi-
tionally, the court held that considering the issue under the Florida Arbitration 
Code would render the same result.29 
                                                          
(2012), Florida’s Patient Brokering Act, FLA. STAT. § 817.505 (2009), and the Federal Civil Monetary 
Penalties Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2012).   Id. 
 16. Visiting Nurse Ass’n, 154 So. 3d at 1122. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  “The circuit court dismissed the motion to vacate and granted the motion to enforce the 
award without little explanation or analysis.”  Id. at 1122-23. 
 20. Id at 1119. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Commercial Interiors Corp. of Boca Raton v. Pinkerton & Laws, Inc.,19 So. 3d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 23. Visiting Nurse Ass’n, 154 So. 3d at 1123. 
 24. Id. at 1124. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1124-25. 
 27. Id. at 1132. 
 28. Id. at 1133. 
 29. Visiting Nurse Ass’n, 154 So. 3d at 1136-38. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Congress passed the FAA30 in 1925, allowing the resolution of disputes by 
arbitration to be enforceable and irrevocable.31  The United States Supreme Court 
has continually affirmed that national policy favors arbitration.32 
A. Vacating an Arbitral Agreement 
This national policy is demonstrated further in the FAA’s limitation on courts 
to vacate arbitral awards.33  A party who has agreed to arbitrate has relinquished 
his or her right to judicial review, and a court will set an arbitral decision aside 
only in very unusual circumstances.34  The FAA sets forth the limited grounds for 
vacatur, which include corruption, fraud or undue means; arbitrator misconduct; 
or arbitrators who “exceeded their powers.”35 
1. Judicially Created Grounds for Vacatur 
Since the adoption of the FAA, lower federal and state courts have recognized 
additional grounds for vacating arbitral awards.36  Although these exceptions are 
judicially recognized, successful challenges on these grounds are rare.37  Parties 
who challenge an arbitral award have a heavy burden since parties often agree to 
arbitration in order to reduce costs, to increase efficiency, and to enhance control 
over who settles the dispute by choosing the arbitrator.38  Allowing parties to va-
cate arbitral awards would result in arbitration beginning, rather than ending, party 
disputes.39 
                                                          
 30. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2012). 
 31. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  The statute states as follows: “A written provision in any maritime transac-
tion or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part 
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  Id. 
 32. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (Congress enacted the FAA 
to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a “national policy favoring arbitration and plac[ing] 
arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.”); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (stating “Congress enacted the FAA to replace judicial indisposition to 
arbitration with a national policy favoring it and placing arbitration agreements on equal footing with 
all other contracts”) (citations omitted); see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements . . .”). 
 33. Wachovia Securities, LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 478 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e begin by noting 
that the FAA limits courts’ ability to vacate arbitral awards as part of its comprehensive scheme to 
replace judicial hostility to arbitration with a national policy favoring it.”) (citing Hall St. Assocs., 552 
U.S. at 581). 
 34. First Options of Chi. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). 
 35. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
 36. Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 
1103, 1110 (2009). 
 37. Id. at 1116. 
 38. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 559 U.S. 
662 (2010) (stating that parties choose arbitration to “enhance efficiency, to reduce costs, or to main-
tain control over who would settle their disputes . . . .”). 
 39. Id. 
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Manifest disregard of the law has been one of the most common grounds for 
arbitral vacatur outside of the FAA statute.40  The United States Supreme Court 
dicta in Wilko v. Swan41 indicated that, although mistaken interpretations of the 
law are not a justifiable reason for vacatur, manifest disregard for the law may be 
permitted.42 
In Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers. Inc.,43 the Eleventh Circuit defined 
manifest disregard of the law and distinguished it from erroneous interpretation.44  
An arbitration panel that incorrectly applies the law has “simply made a legal 
mistake.”45  However, under manifest disregard of the law, the arbitration panel 
must recognize the law and expressly disregard it.46  The other federal circuits 
have defined manifest disregard of the law similarly.47  By 1999, all federal cir-
cuits had adopted the manifest disregard standard as a means of vacating an arbi-
tral award.48 
Arguing that an arbitral award goes against public policy is an even more 
challenging argument on which to prevail.49  For an award to go against public 
policy, the public policy needs to be explicit and well defined in laws and legal 
precedents,50 and the arbitral award must directly violate that policy.51  In State 
University of New York v. Young,52 the New York Supreme Court vacated an arbi-
tral award because it went against public policy.53  In that case, University Hospi-
tal employee David Young was fired for using the same syringe to draw blood 
from different patients.54  Young took the case to arbitration, and the arbitrator 
instead imposed a two-month suspension without pay.55  The hospital appealed, 
and the court held that the lesser-imposed penalty violated the State’s strong pub-
lic policy of providing high-quality, safe hospital services, and the court affirmed 
the lower court’s vacatur.56 
The United States Supreme Court has alluded to a public policy exception 
when the policy is well defined and can be determined “by reference to the laws 
                                                          
 40. See Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest Disregard of the Law” 
Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 143 (2011). 
 41. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479-86 (1989) (holding that predispute agreement to arbitrate claims was 
enforceable).  
 42. Id.  “[T]he interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not 
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”  Id. at 436-37. 
 43. Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc.,128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 44. Id. at 1461. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. LeRoy, supra note 40, at 158-69. 
 48. Id. at 158. 
 49. See Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Auto. Machinists Lodge No. 1173, Int’l Ass’n of Machin-
ists & Aerospace Workers, 886 F.2d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 1989); MasTec N. Am., Inc. v. MSE Power 
Sys., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 321, 329 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. Serv. Employees Int’l 
Union, Dist. 116 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 50. Stead Motors of Walnut Creek, 886 F.2d at 1210. 
 51. Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 782 (11th Cir. 1993) abrogated by Fra-
zier v. Citifinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1322 n. 7 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that there were no statu-
tory grounds for vacating the arbitral award after Hall Street). 
 52. State Univ. of N.Y. v. Young, 170 A.D.2d 510 (1991). 
 53. Id. at 511-12. 
 54. Id. at 511. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 510-12. 
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and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public in-
terests.”57  In United Paperwokers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc.,58 
an employee was discharged for violating a rule against having drugs on plant 
premises.59  The case went to arbitration under the arbitration agreement, and the 
arbitrator ordered the company to reinstate the employee with back pay and full 
seniority.60  The company sought to vacate the award in district court, arguing that 
the award was contrary to public policy because it reduced safety by permitting 
employees under the influence of drugs to operate dangerous machinery.61  The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to vacate, and the Supreme 
Court reversed the decision on the basis that neither court demonstrated that the 
employee was actually under the influence of drugs when he was found.62 Alt-
hough the Court reversed the decision, it stated that a question of whether a con-
tract violates public policy is left to the courts.63 
Additional judicially created grounds for vacating an arbitral award, although 
seldom used, include vacating when the award is arbitrary and capricious64 or 
when the award is found to be irrational.65  Courts have held that an award is arbi-
trary and capricious when an arbitrator’s decision is not clearly based on the facts 
of the case.66  An award is considered to be irrational when there is no support in 
the record to justify it.67  However, courts have typically interpreted irrationality 
to fall under the “exceeded their powers” exception of the FAA statute.68 
Although courts have created extra-statutory grounds for vacatur, the FAA 
does not indicate whether those grounds are permissible.  The United States Su-
preme Court provided some guidance on this issue in Hall Street Associates., 
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.69  In that case, Mattel and Hall Street entered into a lease 
agreement where Mattel would indemnify Hall Street for any costs Mattel in-
curred for failure to comply with environmental laws.70  A dispute arose when the 
property’s water well was found to have high levels of pollutants and Mattel did 
not indemnify Hall Street according to the agreement.71  The parties agreed to 
arbitrate the issue pursuant to an arbitration agreement.72  The agreement also 
                                                          
 57. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 33. 
 60. Id. at 32-34. 
 61. Id. at 34-35. 
 62. Id. at 29, 45. 
 63. United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 43. 
 64. Reuben, supra note 36, at 1114-15; Jack Jarrett, What’s in A Name? Why Judicially Named 
Grounds for Vacating Arbitral Awards Should Remain Available in Light of Hall Street, 20 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 909, 915 (2013). 
 65. Drummond Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 748 F.2d 1495, 1497 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 66. Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that the arbitral award was 
arbitrary and capricious because awarding damages was a reasonable interpretation of the statute and 
was required by law); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co., 415 F.2d 403, 412 (5th Cir. 
1969). 
 67. Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 
277, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 68. See id. (“The irrationality standard comes from the fourth ground ‘exceeded their powers’ provi-
sion . . .”); see also Yonir Technologies, Inc. v. Duration Sys. (1992) Ltd., 244 F. Supp. 2d 195, 210 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 69. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008). 
 70. Id. at 579. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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contained language that permitted the court to review the arbitrator’s award for 
legal error where “(i) the arbitrator’s finding of facts [were] not supported by sub-
stantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law [were] errone-
ous.”73  The arbitrator decided for Mattel, and after multiple appeals and remands, 
the case made its way to the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether 
statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitral award could be supplemented by con-
tract.74 
The Court held that the statutory language of the FAA constituted the exclu-
sive grounds for vacatur and modification of an arbitration award and that a con-
tract could not give the courts authority to review.75  However, the Court did not 
address whether the statute could be supplemented through judicially created 
grounds, which has led to a federal circuit court split as well as differences among 
top state courts on the issue.76 
In Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Bacon,77 the Fifth Circuit analyzed the 
holding in Hall Street and concluded that the Supreme Court intended that Sec-
tions 10 and 11 of the FAA provide the exclusive grounds for vacatur.78  The Sev-
enth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have followed the holding in Citigroup in 
concluding that the Supreme Court was clear in its intention to have the statute set 
forth the only grounds for vacatur.79  Additionally, the First Circuit stated in a 
footnote that Hall Street abolished manifest disregard as a way of vacating an 
arbitral award.80 
On the other side of the split, courts interpret Hall Street narrowly to apply 
only to contractual expansions, and therefore, judicially created grounds such as 
manifest disregard of the law are permissible as grounds for vacatur.81  In Stolt-
Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Second Circuit began its anal-
ysis by concluding that the holding in Hall Street permitted the use of manifest 
disregard of the law as a reason for vacating an arbitral award based on the dicta 
from Wilko.82  The Supreme Court heard the appeal, and in a footnote, the Court 
stated it would not address whether manifest disregard of the law was abolished in 
Hall Street as a judicially created ground for vacatur.83 
Because the Supreme Court refused to rule on the availability of judicially 
created grounds for vacatur, the Second Circuit continues to permit parties to 
                                                          
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 578-582. 
 75. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 578. 
 76. See Michael S. Oberman, ’The Other Shoe’: Are Agreements Narrowing Judicial Review En-
forceable?, 31 ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 71 (2013)  (“After Hall Street, the highest courts of Cali-
fornia, Alabama and Texas held that their state laws permit expanded review and are not preempted by 
the FAA. In contrast, the Maine, Georgia and Tennessee top courts held that their state statutes do not 
permit expanded review.”). 
 77. Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 78. Id. at 353. 
 79. See Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNiel-Janssen Parhm., Inc., 660 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that manifest disregard of the law is not a ground for vacating an arbitral award); Medicine 
Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Court would 
not review the merit’s of arbitrator’s conclusions if the grounds were not enumerated in the FAA); 
Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp.,  604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that judicially created 
grounds for vacatur are no longer viable after Hall Street). 
 80. Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 81. Citigroup Global Markets, 562 F.3d at 355-56. 
 82. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalsFeeds Int’l. Corp, 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2nd Cir. 2008). 
 83. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 677 n.3 (2010). 
7
Sundquist: Do Judicially Created Grounds for Vacating Arbitral Awards Still
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
414 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2015 
claim manifest disregard as a means of vacating arbitral awards.84  The Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits have followed the Second Circuit in holding that manifest disregard 
of the law is a permissible grounds for vacating an arbitral award.85 
2. Vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act 
The most popular and most successful ground for vacatur under the FAA 
statute is enumerated at § 10(a)(4), which provides that a party may seek to set 
aside an arbitral award due to the arbitrator exceeding his or her power.86  Howev-
er, in a study conducted in 2008, parties that argued for vacatur under this excep-
tion prevailed in only 6.3 percent of cases.87  Parties have been most successful in 
establishing that the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers in three types of cases: 
first, where the award granted relief to a non-signatory to the arbitration agree-
ment;88 second, where the award was impermissibly vague;89 and third, where the 
award involved a blatant disregard of the contract.90 
To blatantly disregard the contract, the arbitrator must do more than commit 
serious error, and thus, a party seeking to reverse an award under this section has a 
heavy burden.91  To grant vacatur under § 10(a)(4), a court must find that an arbi-
trator acted outside the scope of his or her contractual duties.92  Courts will look to 
see whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract was probable based on 
the facts of the case and whether the arbitrator acted within his or her scope of 
authority.93  In Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,94 the Supreme Court deter-
                                                          
 84. See T. Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 339-40 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“[W]e concluded that manifest disregard ‘remains a valid ground for vacating arbitral awards.’”) 
(quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 94). 
 85. See Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 85; Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assoc., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 
(9th Cir. 2009) (“We have already determined that manifest disregard ground for vacatur is shorthand 
for a statutory ground under the FAA . . . .”); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 Fed. App’x. 
415, 418 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that the Court could vacate an arbitral award if the Court finds the 
arbitrator to be in manifest disregard of the law). 
 86. Lawrence R. Mills & Thomas J. Brewer, “Exceeded Powers’: Exploring Recent Trends in Cases 
Challenging Tribunal Authority, 31 ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 113 (2013). 
 87. Thomas J. Brewer, Lawrence R. Mills, When Arbitrators “Exceed Their Powers” A New Study 
of Vacated Arbitration Awards, 64 DISP. RESOL. J. 46, 48 (Feb.-April 2009). 
 88. See Lumber Liquidators, Inc. v. Sullivan, No. CIV.A. 10-11890-NMG, 2011 WL 5884252, at *3 
(D. Mass. Aug. 10, 2011) (“the arbitrator exceeded her powers because an arbitration award cannot 
bind a nonparty . . . .”); Brown v. Styles, No. M2010-02403-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3655158, at *6 
n.10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2011) (holding that the agreement at issue did not include a party who 
agreed to arbitrate, therefore the arbitrator exceeded their powers). 
 89. See Asia Pac. Hotel Guam, Inc. v. Dongbu Ins. Co., 2011 Guam 18, 8 (Guam Oct. 24, 2011) 
(vacating an award because the agreement had left open whether the work had been substantially 
completed and whether reasonable documentation had been done). 
 90. See Sonic Auto., Inc. v. Price, No. 3:10-CV-382, 2011 WL 3564884, *15-16 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 
12, 2011) (holding that an arbitrator exceeded his powers by ignoring the plain language of the con-
tract straying from the application of the contract). 
 91. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671 (2010); See Lawrence R. Mills 
& Thomas J. Brewer, ‘Exceeded Powers’: Exploring Recent Trends in Cases Challenging Tribunal 
Authority, 31 ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 113, 125 (2013). 
 92. Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 607 F.3d 634, 643 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 93. See id. (finding that courts “need only to determine whether the arbitrators’ interpretation was 
plausible.”) (quoting Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, 933 F.2d 1481, 
1486 (9th Cir.) (citations omitted); Cent. W. Virginia Energy, Inc. v. Bayer Cropscience LP, 645 F.3d 
267, 276 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e nevertheless have an obligation to ensure that the arbitrator’s decision 
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mined that since the arbitrator reviewed the contract twice and both times he 
found that the contract permitted class proceedings, the arbitrator did not exceed 
his powers in finding that the contract provided for class arbitration.95 
B. Contract Validity 
To avoid arguing vacatur under the FAA statute, parties may argue that the 
contract itself is not valid.  The Supreme Court has categorized challenges to con-
tract disputes involving an arbitration clause into two different categories.96  The 
first type of claim challenges the validity of the arbitration agreement or provision 
itself.97  The second category is when a party challenges the validity of the con-
tract as a whole.98 
Under the first type of claim, the Supreme Court has established that a court 
can hear a dispute regarding a contract with an arbitration provision when there is 
an issue as to whether the parties agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration.99  Addi-
tionally, if the issue concerns contract formation, parties will not be forced to 
submit that claim to arbitration and will be permitted to submit the issue directly 
to the courts.100 
However, courts will likely be restricted from hearing claims as to overall 
contract validity, leaving arbitration as the only means of challenging the validity 
of the contract as a whole.101  Claims that the contract violates state law or was 
fraudulently induced will likely fall under challenges to the contract as a whole 
and will therefore be barred from the jurisdiction of the courts.102  In Buckeye 
Check Cashing v. Cardegna,103 the Supreme Court considered whether a court or 
an arbitrator should decide if a contract with an arbitration provision is void for 
illegality.104  Cardegna argued that the overall agreement violated state consumer 
protection laws, and thus, the award under the contract should be vacated.105  The 
Court held that challenges to the validity of a contract as a whole must be decided 
                                                          
was ‘rationally inferable from the contract.’”) (quoting Qorvis Commc’ns, LLC v. Wilson 549 F.3d 
303, 312 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 94. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2065 (2013). 
 95. Id. But see Muskegon Cent. Dispatch 911 v. Tiburon Inc., 462 Fed. Appx. 517 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that the arbitrator exceeded powers by failing to review the underlying contract). 
 96. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006). 
 97. See e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1984). 
 98. Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 444. 
 99. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 296 (2010) (“It is well settled in 
both commercial and labor cases that whether parties have agreed to submit a particular dispute to 
arbitration’ is typically ‘an issue for judicial determination.”). 
 100. See AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1986). 
 101. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (holding that 
courts are not permitted to hear challenges to the contract as a whole). 
 102. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) (holding that “the FAA supersedes state laws lodging 
primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or administrative.”); Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 
406 (1967) (holding that a claim of fraud in inducement of entire contract is for arbitrators or any claim 
arising out of the agreement). 
 103. Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
 104. Id. at 440. 
 105. Id. at 443. 
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by an arbitrator when the contract contains an arbitration provision.106  Therefore, 
only issues as to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and not contract validity, 
will be heard by the courts. 
C. FAA vs. FAC 
Similar to the FAA, Florida enacted the Florida Arbitration Code (FAC) in 
1957.107  In Florida, the FAC supplements the FAA and when a contract concerns 
interstate commerce, then the FAA supersedes the FAC where the two conflict.108  
After the enactment of the FAC, Florida courts were permitted to review arbitral 
awards for unreasonable departures from the law.109 
However, in 1967, the Florida legislature amended the FAC to include section 
682.13, creating grounds for vacating an arbitral award similar to the grounds for 
vacatur under the FAA.110  Like the FAA, the FAC allows for vacatur of an arbi-
tral award when there is corruption, fraud, or partiality by the arbitrator, or where 
an arbitrator exceeds his or her authority.111  Since this amendment, Florida courts 
have held that the statute sets forth the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitral 
award and have not allowed vacatur for judicially created grounds.112 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
The Florida Supreme Court in Vising Nurse Association began its discussion 
by determining whether the FAA applied in addition to the FAC.113  Since the 
referral of Medicare patients was part of the transaction between the parties, the 
transaction involved interstate commerce, and therefore, the FAA applied in this 
case.114  The court noted that the FAA and FAC are not in conflict with each oth-
er, and thus, the court also applied the FAC to the facts.115 
                                                          
 106. Id. at 449. The Supreme Court relied on the holding in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Co. which stated that contracts as a whole cannot be heard by a court. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 
403-04 (1967). 
 107. Act Effective Oct. 1, 1957, ch. 57-402, § 24, 1957 Fla. Laws 928, 936 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 
57.11 (1957)). 
 108. O’Keefe Architects, Inc. v. CED Constr. Partners, Ltd., 944 So. 2d 181, 184 (Fla. 2006) (holding 
that when there is no interstate commerce the parties follow the FAC and not the FAA). 
 109. See Nat’l Airlines, Inc. v. Metcalf, 114 So. 2d 229, 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (“[T]he 
agreement to arbitrate these disputes and be bound by the award does not preclude a review of proce-
dural due process and jurisdictional limitations.”). 
 110. Compare FLA. STAT. § 682.13 (2014), with 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
 111. FLA. STAT. §682.13 (“the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (b) 
[t]here was: 1. Evident partiality by an arbitrator…[c]orrupton by an arbitrator; or 3. Misconduct…(d) 
[a]n arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s powers; (e) [t]here was no agreement to arbitrate…(f) [t]he 
arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration….”). 
 112. See Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1951) (“Thus, the award of arbitrators in statu-
tory arbitration proceedings cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment . . . [and] if the award is 
within the scope of the submission, and the arbitrators are not guilty of the acts of misconduct set forth 
in the statute, the award operates as a final and conclusive judgment . . . .”); see also Schnurmacher 
Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1989) (holding that the only grounds for vacating an 
arbitral award are set forth in § 682.13). 
 113. Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Florida, Inc. v. Jupiter Med. Ctr., 154 So. 3d 111, 1124 (2014). 
 114. Id. at 1124-25 (listing numerous state and federal cases which all held that the FAA applied 
when Medicare was apart of the disputed transaction). 
 115. Id. at 1125. 
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The court then determined whether a trial court could consider the claim that 
a contract containing an arbitration provision is void for illegality.116  JMC argued 
that the court could choose not to enforce an arbitration panel’s interpretation of a 
contract in three situations: (1) if the contract was illegal; (2) if the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers; or (3) if the contract violated public policy.117 
Relying on Buckeye, the court determined that trial courts cannot review arbi-
tral awards for illegality since legality concerns the contract as a whole.118  The 
court then determined whether the court could review the award under the public 
policy exception.119  The court reviewed the holding in Hall Street Associates 
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,120 in which the United States Supreme Court held that the 
grounds for vacatur and modification provided in the FAA are exclusive and can-
not be supplemented by an agreement.121  The various interpretations of Hall 
Street created a circuit split in the federal courts on the validity of judicially creat-
ed grounds for vacatur.122  The Florida Supreme Court favored the view held by 
the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, and held that 
statutory grounds for vacating an award cannot be supplemented judicially or 
contractually.123 
Next, the court considered whether the arbitration panel exceeded its pow-
er.124  The court relied on the United States Supreme Court holdings in Oxford 
Health Plans L.L.C. v. Sutter125 and Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds International 
Corp.,126 in which the Court discussed that a party seeking to set aside an arbitral 
award bears a very heavy burden under the FAA.127  In Oxford Health Plans, the 
Court held that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers, because the arbitrator 
acted within the scope of the contract by reviewing the parties’ agreement twice 
and concluding that the agreement allowed a class-action proceeding.128  Howev-
er, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court held that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in or-
dering a party to submit to class arbitration when the parties stipulated that they 
never reached an agreement on class arbitration.129 
Here, JMC argued that the arbitrators exceeded their powers because the 
agreement stated that it must be consistent with state and federal health care 
laws.130  The court held that the arbitration panel’s interpretation of the contract 
was not grounds for review under the FAA and that the arbitration panel did not 
exceed its powers under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).131 
                                                          
 116. Id. at 1125-26. 
 117. Id. at 1128. JMC cited numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases which all held that a court would 
refuse to enforce an arbitrator’s award if the contract goes against public policy.  Id. 
 118. Id. at 1126. 
 119. Visiting Nurse Ass’n, 154 So. 3d at 1128. 
 120. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 121. Visiting Nurse Ass’n , 154 So. 3d at 1130 (Fla. 2014). 
 122. Id. at 1130. 
 123. Id. at 1132. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Oxford Health Plans L.L.C. v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2061 (2013). 
 126. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671 (2012). 
 127. Visiting Nurse Ass’n, 154 So. 3d at 1132. 
 128. Id. at 1133. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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Finally, the Florida Supreme Court considered whether trial courts could en-
tertain claims that a contract with an arbitration provision was void for illegality 
and whether the arbitration panel exceeded its authority under the FAC.132  The 
court cited its holding in Schnurmacher Holding Inc. v. Noriga,133 and concluded 
that a court could vacate an award only for reasons set forth in the Florida statute 
and that judicially created grounds for vacatur, such as a public policy exception, 
are not permissible.134  Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court wrote that 
Schnurmacher’s definition of “exceeded their powers” meant that an arbitrator 
must go beyond his or her authority granted by the parties or must decide a ques-
tion not related to the resolution of the issue submitted.135  In this case, the parties 
authorized the panel to resolve any dispute or claim arising out of the agree-
ment.136  Therefore, the court held that the panel did what the parties had request-
ed and did not exceed its powers.137 
V. COMMENT 
Since the enactment of the FAA, there has been a strong federal presumption 
in favor of arbitration.138  Very few arbitral awards are reversed.139  Therefore, it is 
likely that when the Supreme Court takes up the circuit split, it will likely hold 
that judicially created grounds for vacating arbitral awards are not permissible.  
However, refusal to permit vacatur on grounds of manifest disregard of the law 
and public policy would have negative consequences and should therefore be 
categorized under the exceeded powers exception in the statute. 
The Court’s failure to clearly address whether judicially created grounds for 
vacatur are permissible has led to a split among the federal circuits as well as the 
state courts.140  In Hall Street, the Supreme Court sought to address a circuit split 
over whether the statutory grounds for vacatur were exclusive or could be sup-
plemented by agreement.141  The Court’s use of the strong language “exclusive 
grounds” throughout the opinion led the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits to conclude that the Court intended the statutory language of the FAA to 
provide the only grounds for vacatur and thereby made judicially created grounds 
impermissible.142  Due to the federal policy favoring arbitration and the Court’s 
strong language in Hall Street, it is likely that when the Court addresses the circir-
                                                          
 132. Id. at 1124, 1132, 1136. 
 133. Schnurmacher Holding Inc. v. Noriga, 542 So. 2d 1327 (1989). 
 134. Visiting Nurse Ass’n, 154 So. 3d at 1135-36. 
 135. Id. at 1136. 
 136. Id. at 1137. 
 137. Id. at 1137-38. 
 138. See Wachovia Securities, LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 478 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 139. Reuben, supra note 36, at 1116. 
 140. See Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 353 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that mani-
fest disregard of the law does not constitute a grounds for vacating an arbitral award); see also 
Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNiel-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 660 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (considering 
manifest disregard of the law as a valid grounds for vacatur); Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., 
Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating it will only vacate on grounds enumerated in the FAA); 
Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that judicially 
created grounds for vacatur were abolished in Hall Street). 
 141. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008). 
 142. Citigroup Glob. Mkrts, 562 F.3d at 353; see Affymax, 660 F.3d at 284; Med. Shoppe, 614 F.3d at 
489; Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1324. 
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cuit split, it will hold that judicially created grounds are not permissible for vacat-
ing arbitral awards. 
However, the Court should permit manifest disregard and public policy ex-
ceptions under the FAA.  The Supreme Court indicated its willingness to accept 
the manifest disregard exception in dicta of Wilko.143  Nevertheless, the Court’s 
intention was unclear, and the circuit courts have had a difficult time discerning 
whether the exception exists.  The Supreme Court had the opportunity to address 
whether Wilko created manifest disregard of the law as a permissible means of 
vacatur in Hall Street.  However, the Court instead stated, “[M]aybe the term 
‘manifest disregard’ was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it 
merely referred to the §10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them.”144  
The Court was given a second opportunity to address whether manifest disregard 
was an acceptable ground for vacatur in Stolt-Nielsen and yet again the Court 
stated it would not address the issue.145   
The Eleventh Circuit has defined manifest disregard of the law as recognizing 
the law but disregarding it.146  Other circuit courts have defined manifest disregard 
of the law similarly.147  In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court held that because the 
arbitration panel did not follow either the FAA or New York law to make its deci-
sion, it had exceeded its powers.148  The two definitions are similar enough that 
allowing manifest disregard of the law to fall under the exceeded powers excep-
tion to the FAA would not overstep the Court’s interpretation and therefore should 
remain viable as a means of vacatur. 
If, however, the Court does not allow manifest disregard as a grounds for va-
catur, it will give arbitrators too much control over cases and leave the parties 
without any judicial review.  Checks and balances must be in place to prevent the 
violation of individuals’ rights.  Additionally, many statutes are enacted to protect 
and ensure safe business practices.  For example, anti-kickback statutes prevent 
physicians and medical organizations from engaging in corrupt practices that 
could be dangerous to patients.149  Manifest disregard of the law as a ground for 
vacatur allows a party to seek justice when the arbitrators have clearly disregarded 
applicable laws.  Additionally, it could prevent parties from seeking biased arbi-
trators they know will enforce illegal contracts.   
Forbidding courts to use vacatur in the interest of public policy would be an-
other mistake as it could cause safety issues and give arbitrators legislative author-
ity.  Public policy is characterized as a principle that prevents injury to the public 
and is considered synonymous to “the public good.”150  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that courts have the ability to refuse to enforce a contract that violates 
                                                          
 143. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479-86 (1989) (holding that predispute agreement to arbitrate 
claims was enforceable). 
 144. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 585. 
 145. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010). 
 146. Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 147. LeRoy, supra note 40, at 168. 
 148. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 676-77. 
 149. See Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)-27(b) 
(2012)); see also 73 Fed. Reg. 56841 (Sept. 30, 2008) (discussing the compliance program which 
increases resident and patient safety). 
 150. Erich Vieth & James P. Lemonds, Whence Public Policy?, 52 J. MO. B. 239 (1996). 
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public policy.151  However, the Court has not clearly addressed whether arbitrators 
are the only individuals capable of hearing arguments that contracts containing 
arbitration provisions are void for public policy. 
Allowing arbitrators to enforce agreements that clearly violate public policy 
could have serious safety ramifications.  For example, if the New York Supreme 
Court had not granted vacatur in State University of New York, a precedent would 
have been set that arbitrators could impose more lenient punishment for individu-
als who have clearly violated public policy and who have put patients’ safety at 
risk.152  Additionally, in United Paperworkers, had the employee been found on 
the premises under the influence of drugs and operating dangerous equipment, he 
could have caused harm to himself and other workers.153   
Permitting arbitrators to uphold arbitral awards that violate public policy 
would also give arbitrators legislative policy power when they are meant to serve 
a judicial role.  Legislatures often create statutes designed to protect the public.  
Courts then have the authority to decide whether those statutes are being followed.  
Similar to judges, arbitrators are given a judicial role in reviewing the applicabil-
ity of those same public policy statutes.  However, arbitration proceedings are 
considered private.154  Therefore, arbitrators do not have to answer to the public 
for the decisions that they make; nor are they held to the same standards as the 
judiciary.  Although arbitral awards that violate public policy may be vacated 
under the FAA, without judicial review of public policy violations, arbitrators are 
able to interpret statutes with little chance of a court reviewing their interpretation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Hall Street created a divide in the circuits as 
to whether judicially created grounds for vacatur such as manifest disregard of the 
law and violations to public policy are permissible.155  Based on the strong lan-
guage the Supreme Court used in Hall Street, and on the strong federal presump-
tion in favor of arbitration, the Court will likely hold judicially created grounds for 
vacatur are impermissible. 
However, removing manifest disregard of the law and public policy excep-
tions from judicial review could grant arbitrators too much power in deciding 
whether to follow the law and whether to uphold public policy violations.  There-
fore, the United States Supreme Court should interprete the FAA to permit mani-
fest disregard of the law and violations of public policy as grounds for vacatur. 
 
                                                          
 151. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987) (“A court’s refusal to 
enforce an arbitrator’s award under a collective-bargaining agreement because it is contrary to public 
policy is a specific application of a general doctrine, rooted in the common law, that a court may refuse 
to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy.”). 
 152. See State Univ. of N.Y. v. Young, 170 A.D.2d 510, 511-12 (1991). 
 153. See United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 42. 
 154. Bert K. Robinson, Arbitration: The Quest for Confidentiality, 58 LA. B.J. 180, 181 (2010). 
 155. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400-02 (2008). 
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